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On  the  Changing  Nature  of  Technological 
Accumulation  and  Innovation.  From  S&T  to 
Industrial R&D 
Traditional R&D based technological progress which is still very much 
dominant  in  many  industrial  sectors  ranging  from  the  chemical  and 
pharmaceutical  industries  to  motor  vehicles,  semiconductors  and 
electronic  consumer  goods  has  been  characterized  by  the  ability  to 
organise technological improvements along clear agreed upon criteria 
and  a  continuous  ability  to  evaluate  progress.  At  the  same  time  a 
crucial part of the engineering research consisted, as Richard Nelson 
put it, “of the ability to hold in place”: to replicate at a larger industrial 
scale and to imitate experiments carried out in the research laboratory 
environment.  As  a  result  it  involved  first  and  foremost  a  cumulative 
process of technological progress: a continuous learning from natural 
and deliberate experiments. 
Keywords: innovation, science, technology, research and development 
1. Introduction  
Science  and  Technology  has  been  the  subject  of  public  interest  and 
support  for  centuries.  The  acceptance  of  a  utilitarian  argument  for  the  public 
support  of  basic  scientifi  research  predates  the  Industrial  Revolution  itself. 
Although government and university laboratories had existed earlier, it was only in 
the 1870s  hat the first specialised  R&D  laboratories were  established in industry 
(Mowery, 1983).What became most distinctive about this form of  ndustrial  R&D  
was its scale, its scientific content and the extent of its professional specialisation. 
A much greater part of technological progress became now attributable to  R&D 
work  performed  in  specialised  laboratories  or  pilot  plants  by  full time  qualified 
staff.  It  is  this  sort  of  professional  work,  which  is  today  recorded  in  official, 
internationally  harmonized  R&D statistics. Already in the early days of defining 
what was to become the OECD Frascati Manual definition of “R&D”, it was obvious 
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that it would not be possible to measure the part time  and amateur inventive 
work of typical 19th century research. The present industrial R&D  statistics are 
therefore  a  reflection,  and    also  a  measure  of,  the  professionalisation  of  R&D 
activities. And while  the extent of secialisation should not be exaggerated – even 
today in many manufacturing firms  the “technical” or “engineering” departments 
or  “OR”  sections contribute  far more to the technical improvement of an existing 
process  than the  formal R&D department,  more narrowly defined –  the balance 
has  significantly  changed  over  the  20th  Century  with  a  gradual  further 
specialisation of the R&D function. It is the emergence of this particular function, 
which  can  be  most  closely  identified  with  the  emergence  and  growth  of  the 
industrial society. 
This industrial research “revolution” was, however, not just a question of 
change  in  scale.  It  also  involved    a  fundamental  change  in  the  relationship  
between society on the one  hand and  technology and  science on the other. The 
expression “technology”, with its connotation of a more formal and  systematic 
body of learning, only came into general use when the techniques of  production  
reached a stage of complexity where traditional methods no longer sufficed. The 
older, more primitive arts and crafts technologies continued to exist side by side 
with th  new “technology”. But the way in which more scientific techniques would 
be  used  in  producing,  distributing  and  transporting  goods  led  to  a  shift  in  the  
ordering of industries alongsid their “technology”  intensity. Thus, typical for most 
Western industrial  societies of the 20th Century, there were  now  high technology 
intensive industries, having as major sectoral characteristic the heavy, own, sector 
internal R&D investments and  low technology  intensive, more craft techniques 
based industries, with very little own R&D efforts. And while in many policy debate, 
industrial dynamism became as a result somewhat naively  associate  with jus  the 
dominance in a country’s industrial structure of the presence of  high technology 
intensive sectors, the more sophisticated sectoral studies on the particular features 
of inter sectoral technology flows, from Pavitt (1984) to Malerba (2004), brought 
back  to  the  forefront    many  of  the  unmeasured,  indirect  sources  of  technical 
progress in the analysis. 
At    the  same  time,  the  “science”  and  “technology”  parts  of  research 
developed  increasingly  autonomously  and  with  an  increasing  degree  of 
independence from each other, certainly when compared to the early phases of 
the Industrial Revolution. The latter could be described as a period of “industrial 
enlightenment” (Mokyr, 2005): a period of close and fruitful interactions between  
industrialists searching for a better scientific understanding of their technological 
inventions, and scientists keen on understanding the underlying scientifi principles 
of those new  ndustrial technologies. Thus the further development of the steam 
engine influenced thermodynamics,  whilst scientific  knowledge  of  electricity and 
magnetism  became  the  basis  for  the  electrical  engineering  industry.  The  two 
bodies of knowledge were nevertheless generated by distinct professions in quite 
different ways and with largely independent traditions. The scientific community   147 
was  concerned  with  discovery  and  with  the  publication  of  new  knowledge  in  a  
form,  which  would  meet  the  professional  criteria  of  their  fellow  scientists. 
Application was ultimately of secondary importance or not even considered. For 
the engineer or technologist on the other hand, publication was of secondary or 
negligible importance. The first concern was with the  practical application and the 
professional recognition, which came from the demonstration of a working device 
or design. 
Elsewhere I have described the growing dichotomy between science and 
technology  over  the  last  two  decades  as  a  “Dutch  knowledge  disease” 
phenomenon  (Soete,  2004).  A  process,  which  has  been  set  in  motion  in  the 
1970/80s  and  consisted  of  a  dual  “crowding  out”.  A  “crowding  out”  of 
fundamental, basic research from private firms’ R&D  activities on the one hand 
and  a  process  of  “crowding  out”  of  applied  research  from    public,  primarily 
academic university research. The first process found its most explicit expression in 
the  reorganisation  of R&D  activities,  from  often  autonomou laboratories directly 
under the responsibility of the Board of Directors in the 60’s to more decentralized 
R&D activities integrated and fully part of separate business units.  
Today only firms in the  pharmaceutical  sector and a couple of large firms 
outside  of  this  sector  are  still  involve  in  the  funding  and  carrying  out  of 
fundamental  research  (as  reflected  e.g.  in  the  number  of  scientific  publications 
authored by private firms). For most firms the increased complexity of science and 
technology has meant a greater focus on  applied and development research and a 
more  explicit  reliance  on  external,  university  or  other,  often  public,  knowledge 
centres for more fundamental  research  input.  
Firms now “shop” on the world market for access to basic and fundamental 
research and choose the best locations to locate their R&D laboratories. In doing  
so  they will not only hope to make their own, in house R&D more efficient, but 
also look to the efficiency, quality, and  dynamics of the external universities and 
public R&D institutions. 
At  the  other  end  of  thespectrum,  public  research  investments  in 
universities  and  other  public  research  institutes  became,  in  most  advanced 
countries,  increasingly  subject  to  national  public  scrutiny  ove  the  80’s  and  90’s 
through  systematic    performance  assessment  and  academic  peer  review.  As  a  
result, academic performance became even more explicitly the dominant  incentive 
in public research institutes while applied, or more immediately  relevant research, 
was  second  rated.  Hence,  in  many  countries,  particularly  in  Europe,  applied 
research became “crowded out” of the university environment. 
These opposing “crowding out” trends in the nature o private and  public 
research have to some extent accompanied the gradual shift in the economy from 
an  industrial  society  to  a  more  service  based,  immaterial  economy,  in  which 
industrial production is no longer the prime recipient and carrier of technological 
improvement. 
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  2. The emerging knowledge economy paradigm 
There  has  been  over  the  last  twenty  years  a  major  shift  in  the 
understanding  of  the  relationships  between    research,  innovation  and  socio 
economic development. 
First, economists have come to accept that knowledge accumulation might 
well be analysed, like the accumulation of any other capital good.  
In short that economic principles can be applied to the  production and 
exchange  of knowledge; and,  that knowledge is intrinsically endogenous to the 
economic and the social system, not an external, “black box factor  only to be 
opened by scientists and engineers” in Christopher Freeman’s (1974) celebrated 
words. Hence, while knowledge has some specific features of its own, it can be 
produced and used in the production of other goods, even in the production of 
itself, like any othercapital  good that is used a an input in the production process. 
It also can be stored and will be subject to  depreciation, when skills deteriorate or 
people no longer use particular knowledge and, in the extreme case, forget about 
it. It might even become obsolete, when new knowledge supersedes  and renders 
it worthless; as in the case with leading edge technologies. 
However,  there  are  some  fundamental  differences  with  traditional 
industrial capital goods. First,  and  foremost, the production of knowledge will not 
take the form of a  physical piece of equipment, but will be embedded in some 
specific blueprint form (a  patent, an artefact, a design, a software program, a 
manuscript, a omposition), in human beings or even in organisations. In each of 
these cases there will be so called positive externalities: the knowledge embodied 
in such blueprints, people or organisations cannot be fully appropriated, it will with 
little  cost  to  the  knowledge  creator  flow  away  to  other  firms  or  to  the  public 
knowledge  stock.  Knowledge  is  from  this  perspective  a  non rival  good.  Many 
people can share it without diminishing in any way the amount available of any 
one of them. 
Second,  the  emergence  of  the  cluster  of  new  information  and 
communication technologies (ICTs) has  also had a  direct impact on research, 
international  knowledge  access and  innovation. ICTs are in the real sense of the 
word an information technology, the essence of which consists of the increased 
memorisation  and  storage,  speed,  manipulation  and  interpretation  of  data  and 
information.  In  short,  it  is  what  has  been  characterized  as  the  codificatio  of 
knowledge. As a consequence, information technologymakes codified knowledge, 
data and information much  more accessible than before it all sectors and agents 
in  the economy linked  to  information  networks or with  the   knowledge  how  to 
access such networks. But ICTs have also had a direct impact on the R&D  process 
itself.  
Research  laboratories  are  today  equipped  with  sophisticated  ICT 
equipment  allowing  more  precision,  reliability  and  expanding  dramatically  the 
scope  for  research  in  many  different  scientific  fields.  The  intensive  use  of   149 
sophisticated  ICT instruments in the process of R&D is one of the major factors 
contributing to the  increase in the efficiency in research over the last decades. 
At the same time, the increased potential for  international  codification  
and transferability of knowledge linked to the use of ICTs, implies that knowledge, 
including economic knowledge becomes to some extent globally available. While 
the local capacities to use or have the competence to access such knowledge wil 
vary  widely,  the  access  potential  is  there.  ICT,  in  other  words,  brings  to  the 
forefront  the  enormou potential for catching up, based upon cost advantages and 
economic transparency of (dis ) advantages, while stressing at the same time the 
crucial tacit and  other competence elements in the capacity to acces international 
codified  knowledge.  For  technologically    leading  countries  or  firms,  this  implies 
increasing erosion of monopoly rents associated with innovation and shortening of 
product life cycles. Research efforts maynot be profitable anymore in this setting, 
from  the  perspective  of  a  single  firm.  The  ability  of  each  economic  actor  to 
innovate  single handedly  in  such  a  global  setting  is  becoming  more  risky,  and 
stresses  the  role  of  strong  technology  clusters  and  government  investment  in 
knowledge. 
Third, the perception of the nature of innovation processes has changed 
significantly over the last decade. Broadly speaking, innovation capability is seen 
less in terms of the  ability to discover new technological principles, but more in  
terms  of  the  ability  to  exploit  systematically  the  effects  produced  by  new 
combinations  and  use  of  pieces  in  the  existing  stock  of  knowledge  (David  and 
Foray, 2002). This new model, closely associated with the emergence of numerous 
knowledge  “service”  activities,  implies  to  some  extent  more  routine  use  of  a 
technological base allowing forinnovation without the need for leaps in technology, 
sometimes  referred  to  as  “innovation  without  research”.  It  requires  systematic 
access  to  the  state of the art  technologies;  each  industry  must  introduce 
procedures for the dissemination of information regarding the stock of technologies 
available,  so  that  individual  innovators  can  draw  upon  the  work  of  other 
innovators. This mode of knowledge generation  based on the recombination and 
re use of known practice  raises also much more information search problems and 
must confront the problems of the impediments to accessing the existing stock of 
information that are created by intellectual property right laws. 
The new concept of a “science, technology and  innovation system”  is, in 
other words, shifting  towards a more  complex, socially distributed structure of 
knowledge production activities, involving a much greater diversity of organizations 
having  as  explicit  goal  knowledge  production.  The  old  system  reviewed  above 
under  a),  was,  by  contrast,  based  on  a  simple  dichotomy  between  knowledge 
generation  and  deliberate  learning  (R&D  laboratories  and  universities)  and 
activities o production and consumption where the motivation for acting was not to 
acquire  new  knowledge  but  rather  to  produce  or  use  effective  outputs.  The 
collapse  (or  partial  collapse)  of  this  dichotomy  leads  to  a  proliferation  of  new 
places having the explicit  goal of producing knowledge and undertaking deliberate   150 
research activities, which may not be readily observable but nevertheless essential 
to sustain innovative activities in a global environment. 
To  summarize, traditional R&D based technological progress which is still 
very  much  dominant  in  many  industrial  sectors  ranging  from  the  chemical  and 
pharmaceutical  industries  to  motor  vehicles,  semiconductors  and  electronic 
consumer goods has been characterized by the ability to organise technological 
improvements along clear agreed upon criteria and a continuous ability to evaluate 
progress. At he same time  a crucial part of the engineering research consisted, as 
Richard  Nelson put it, “of  the ability to  hold in place”: to replicate at a larger 
industrial scale and  to imitate  experiments  carried out in the research laboratory 
environment.  As  a  result it  involved  first and foremost a cumulative  process  of 
technological  progress:  a  continuous  learning  from  natural  and  deliberate 
experiments. 
The  more  recent  mode  of  technological  progress  described  above  and 
more associated with the knowledge  paradigm and the service economy, with as 
extreme  form  the  attempts  at  ICT based  efficiency  improvements  in  e.g.  the 
financial and insurance sectors, the wholesale and retail sectors, health, education, 
government  services,  business  management  and  administration,  is  much  more 
based on flexibility and confronted with intrinsic difficulties  in replication.  Learning 
from  previous experiences  or  from  other  sectorsis difficult  and  sometimes  even 
misleading. Evaluation is difficult because of changing external environments: over 
time, among sectors, across locations. It willoften  be impossible to separate out 
specifi  context variables from real causes and effects. Technological progress will 
in other words be much more of the trial and error base yet without as in the life 
sciences  providing  “hard”  data,  which  can  be  scientifically  analysed  and 
interpreted. The resultis that technological progress will be less predictable, more 
uncertain and ultimately  more closely associated with entrepreneurial risk taking. 
Attempts at reducing such risks might  involve, as Von Hippel (2004) has argued, a 
much greater importance given to users, already in the research process itself. 
This shift as I will argue in the next section has major implications for the 
functioning of the ESM, as typified in the German version of that model.  
The  German  social  model was  to some  extent the  “ideal” type of social 
industrial  model  (with  Japan)  with  strong  incentives  for  firms  to  invest  in  the 
internal  learning  and  upgrading  of  their  work  force,  a  close  and  privileged 
interaction  between  firms  and  higher  education  establishments  (dual  learning 
systems)  and  specialized  industrial  R&D  and  engineering  departments, 
guaranteeing  a  continuous  improvement  in  production  and  organisational 
efficiency.  It  resulted  in  continuous  improvements  in  the  international 
competitiveness (unit labour costs) of German production as reflected in German 
trade  surpluses,  still  the  case  today.  It  also  explains  the  high  expectations  of 
economists in the 80’s of the German (and Japanese) “Standort“ likely to take over 
US industrial technology dominance.   151 
Compared  to  the  new  mode  of  technological  progress,  the  previous 
advantages  of  this  social  model  are  now  quickly  turning  into  disadvantages 
primarily associated with major emerging inflexibilities, which are to some extent 
at loggerheads with the newly required flexibility in the new knowledge paradigm. 
 
  3. Reflecting on the implications for Europe’s social model 
The organisational and social challenges associated with the emerging new 
knowledge paradigm described  above and also closely associated with  the service 
economy and the “e conomy”, have, and maybe somewhat paradoxically given the 
original  emphasis  on  e Europe  in  Lisbon,  not  really  been  addressed  in  the 
discussions leading up to the Lisbon summit. Most of the discussions focused  on 
the  technological  aspects  of  knowledge  creation  and  development,  the  lagging 
position of the EU vis ŕ vis the US, the need for a European research area and 
better coordination of member states research policies, the shortages of scientists 
and engineers, etc. The challenges of the emerging knowledge paradigm for the 
social models in European members states (MS) were barely addressed. 
Yet it is clear that in a knowledge driven society as described above there 
are likely to be many institutional, social and cultural bottlenecks to entrepreneurial 
risk taking,  trial and error innovation and the ensuing creative  destruction, which 
touch  directly  on  the  functioning  of  the  ESM.  To  some  extent  the  Lisbon 
declaration was not only an expression of a political desire to strive for a Europe 
belonging to the world’s most knowledge intensive regions in ten years, but also 
that this  was  to  happen within the  context  of a  strengthened,  ‘activated’ social 
Europe  that would have an eye for past social achievements.  
The  question that was not  addressed was  how activating labour markets 
would enhance the shift towards the new knowledge paradigm. 
Economists such as Giles Saint Paul have analysed the relationship between labour 
market  institutions,  and  in    particular    the  costs  of  hiring  and  dismissing 
employees,  and  the  development  of  innovations  from  a  purely  theoretical 
perspective.  Hiring  and  firing  costs  are  in  many  ways  the  most  explicit 
manifestation  of  the  industrial  employment  “security“  embedded  in  European 
continental social welfare states – the Bismarck model. They have led to stability in 
labour  relations  and  have  represented  a  useful  incentive  for  employers  and 
employees  alike  to  invest  in  human  capital.  However,  in  terms  of  the  new 
knowledge  paradigm  and  in  particular  the  accompanying  process  of  “creative 
destruction” which might accompany the development of new activities – whether 
concerned with new product, process or organisational innovations – this model 
will raise dramatically the costswith which “destruction” can be realized. Thus as 
shown in Saint Paul’s model, the US, with lower firing costs, will eventually gain a 
competitive advantage in the introduction of new, innovative products and process 
developments onto the market, while continental Europe will become specialized in   152 
technology following  activities,  based  on  secondary,  less  radical  improvement 
innovations. 
In  other  words,  the  dynamics  of  innovation,  of  entrepreneurship,  of 
creative destruction thrives better in an environment providing higher rewards for 
creativity and curiosity than in an environment  putting a higher premium on the 
security  of  employment,  internal  learning  and  efficiency  improvements  in  the 
production of existing products. Viewed from this perspective, the gap between 
Europe, and in particular continental Europe, and the United States in terms of  
innovative capacity, efficiency, and wealth creation may look like the price Europe 
had  to pay for not wanting to give up the social securities and  achievements 
associated with its social model. Many of the proposals on “activating the labour 
market” with  by  now popular  concepts like “empowerment”  and  “employability” 
appear to go hand in hand with innovation and growth dynamics, others though do 
not. Some European countries such as the UK and Denmark appear to have been 
more  successful  in  reducing  dismissing  costs  than  others,  and  appea  to  have 
benefited much more from the knowledge  paradigm in terms of growth dynamics. 
The central question, which must be raised within this context is whether 
the  social  security  model  developed  at  the  time  of  the  industrial  society  is  not 
increasingly  inappropriate  for  the  large  majority  of  what  could  be  described  as 
“knowledge workers”: workers who are likely to be less physically (but by contrast 
possibly  more  mentally)  worn  out  by  work  than  the  old  type  of  blue  collar, 
industrial  workers.  The  short  working  hours,  the  early  retirement  schemes,  the 
longer  holidays  might  well  appear  to  knowledge  workers  less  of  a  social 
achievement;  work  not  really  representing  a  “disutility”  but  more  an  essential 
motivating activity, providing even a meaning to life. 
There is in other words, I would argue a need for a fundamental rethinking 
of the universality of social security systems in European countries social welfare 
systems. That rethinking should recognize explicitly the emerging duality in  the 
labour force betwee work involving “labour”, i.e. a physical or mental wearing out 
activity,  and  work  involving  “pleasure”,  i.e.  activities  providing  primarily  self 
satisfaction in terms of recognition, realisation and creativity. Workers involved in 
the  first  sort  of  activity  will  consider  the  social  achievements,  including  
employment  security,  a  relatively  short  working  life  and  short  weekly  working 
hours, as important social achievements and intrinsically  associated with  their  
quality  of life, which they will not be prepared to give up.  
Workers involved in the second sort of activity, have been given hese similar 
social rights by extensio because of labour law universality principles. At the same 
time  such  an  automatic  extension  of  social  rights  appear  by  and  large 
inappropriate  and  could  be  considered  to  be  behind  the  lack  of  dynamism  of 
knowledge workers in Europe. Furthermore, the full application  of the social model 
to the growing proportion of knowledge workers undermines the sustainability of 
the  social  model  itself.  In  short,  when  work  involves  significant  positive 
externalities as in the case of knowledge work, it appears particularly inappropriate   153 
to apply social “security” guarantee to employment aimed first  and foremost at 
reducing the negative externalities of physical work. 
 
  4. Conclusions 
  The new Lisbon strategy “Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs” consists 
of  24    guidelines  brought  together  under  five  broad  headlines.Reflecting    the 
reformulation of the political priorities of the Lisbon strategy after the mid term 
review (July 2005) under three headlines (“knowledge  and innovation  – engines 
of  sustainable growth”; “making Europe a more attractive place to invest and to 
work”; “more and better jobs”) the  different guidelines appear, I would argue, still 
poorly integrated. In this paper the focus has been on the first of these political 
priorities:  knowledge  and  innovation.  Europe’s  failure  to  achieve  significant  
progress  under  this  heading  over  the  last  five  years  has  much  to  do  with  the 
interaction  between  knowledge  and  innovation  and  the  three  other  broad 
guidelines considered in Table 1. The  knowledge society which  has emerged in 
Europe is, as has been argued here, indeed not an exogenous one, external to 
Europe’s  macroeconomic  policy,  competition  policy  or  social  model,  but  fully 
endogenous to those other areas of economic policy. 
  In this sense our discussion, while limited to the social policy implications of 
the  shift  from  industrial  R&  to  information  based  innovation,  highlights 
nevertheless  the  complete  lack  of  integratio  of  the  knowledge  and  innovation  
Lisbon  priority with the other areas of the Lisbon strategy. The Lisbon strategy 
interpretation  of  “knowledge  and  innovation  as  engines  of  sustainable  growth”  
represents  still, I would argue, and  despit  brave attempts of the  Commission to 
proof  the  contrary,  a  very  segmented  policy  approach,  addressing  first  and 
foremost  the  traditional  R&D  and  innovation  member  countries  and  EC  policy 
constituencies.  
  The  proposed  guidelines  and  the  further  detailed  proposals  from  the  
Commission  (EC,    2005)  are  from  this  perspective  more  reminiscent  of  the  old  
industrial R&D model than of  the emerging knowledge economy paradigm model 
described  above.  The  only  shift  in  attention  paid  is  with  respect  to  potential 
regulatory barriers to research and  innovation, reflecting the broadening ofvision 
no  longer  to  limit  support  policies  to  just  R&D  but  also  to  include  now  more 
systematically innovation, raising at the same time new competition policy issues. 
However, no attention is paid to interactions with Europe’s social model, or with 
education  policy  buried  as  guideline  23  under  the  “more  and  better  jobs”.  The 
result of this relatively narrow focus is that the proposed integrated guidelines are 
anything but integrated and convey an impression of “over structure” with target 
setting on a multitude of particular aspects of knowledge and innovation which are 
by and large outside of the control of policy makers. 
  Second, there is, I would argue a need for a fundamental rethinking of the 
universality principles of social security systems as they were developed in  Europe   154 
last Century, in a variety of ways, in broad synergy with  the emerging industrial 
society. Such a rethinking should recognize the duality in the labour force between 
work involving  “labour”,  i.e. a physical or mental wearing  out activity, and work 
involving “pleasure”, i.e. activities providing primarily self satisfaction in terms of 
recognition,  realisation  and  creativity.  As  I    argued  in  section  2  of  this  paper, 
workers involved in the first sort of activity are likely to consider the past social 
achievements of the European social model as important achievements intrinsically 
associated  with  their  quality  of  life.  They  will  consider  any  change  of  those 
conditions  as  a  clear  deterioration  in  their  quality  of  life  and  reject  it.  Workers 
involved in the second sort of activity, call them knowledge workers, are not so 
much  in  need  of  social  measures  aimed  at  reducing  negative  externalities  of 
physical work. Their work involves primarily positive externalities. Obviously they 
also will appreciate social “security” guarantees their employment, but these will 
rather be used  as substitute rather than as complement for own life long learning 
efforts and investments. Effectively, knowledge workers are “free  riding” on social 
“security” guarantees designed in another industrial age and aimed at a different 
category  of  workers.  The  automatic  extension  of  social  rights  to  knowledge 
workers  appears  from  this  perspective  not  only  unjustified,  undermining  the 
financial sustainability of the European social model, but could well also explain the 
lack of dynamism of knowledge workers in Europe. 
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